Self-Portrait of Nixon in the Campaign and Other

By William H. Stringer Richard M. Nixon,

quickly gaining wide bress Communist policy, a family comment, will help to persuade man with a courageous wife Californians, and United States and two very normal daughopinion generally, that Mr. ters, an Eisenhower-type Re-Nixon is a figure of national publican. and international experience. This book simplifies the and not solely a defeated Vice Alger Hiss case without, it President and budding west appears, oversimplifying. It coast gubernatorial aspirant makes clear the dogged resolve lost our tempers. But exactly Indeed this was undoubtedly of a fledgling vice-presidental the opposite was true. I had

ences, headlined in the press, publicans were telling him to are fairly familiar. The fund get off the Eisenhower ticket, the crises and the Caracas mob It pinpoints the clear determitedicated, unrelaxed candidate scenes were excellently cov- nation of Mr. Nixon to avoid who came within a fignat'stedicated, unrelaxed candidate scenes were excellently covariation of that ready harder than I did. with the appearance of seizing any sense of responsibility? The power during President Eisen, which is problem of that crucial first television admits the loss howers illness; his problem of that crucial first television account adds insight into Nixon was "to provide leadership debate, not on issues but on without appearing to lead?" evealing account of his sessed with very straightfor-energetic career to date. the man—an individual pos-sessed with very straightfor-ward ideas about right and The big 460-page volume, wrong, few doubts about anti-

Six Crises, by Richard M. one purpose in penning these candidate to clear his name of the "California fund" charge day & Co. 460 pp. \$5.95.

Some of the Nixon experi-Some of the Nixon experi- even while highly placed Rences, headlined in the press, publicans were telling him to without appearing to lead."

two consummate politicians in advantage.

full and complete control of my temper and was aware of it. . . Khrushchev never loses his temper—he uses it." The appendix incidentally usefully reprints Mr. Nixon's radio-TV address to the Soviet people during his Moscow visit—a speech which remains to this day one of the few verbal penetrations of the closed Soviet society by a top Washington official.

But the most revealing section concerns the 1960 campaign. Here is Mr. Nixon's stout denial that he conducted any sort of "me-too" campaign. To win, he had to hold the GOP vote while persuading five to six million Democrats to "leave their own candidate." He maintains that on campaign issues "I drew the line between us coldly and clearly and could

not have hit him (Mr. Kennedy) harder than I did, with

appearance (poor lighting, underweight condition). The rest of the campaign was an ardu-We learn something about ous struggle to regain the lost

two consummate politicians in the Khrushchev "kitchen cabinet" debate chapter when Mr. Nixon comments:

"To some, it may have looked as though we had both lost our tempers. But exactly then iconardized American seems."

advantage.

"Here also is the charge, now denied by the Central Intelligence Agency, that candidate Kennedy was briefed by the CIA on United States plans for using Cuban exiles to overthrow Premier Castro (and then iconardized American seems). lost our tempers. But exactly then jeopardized American security by advocating just such a project). One might argue almost as validly that Mr. Kennedy was helpfully mobilizing public opinion to accept the strategy.

> Mr. Nixon fixes strong responsibility on Robert F. Kennedy and some labor leaders for keeping the religious issue on the front burner throughout the campaign while seeming to deplore bigotry. He also makes a charge that some few newsmen let their personal preferences for Mr. Kennedy bias their campaign coverage, thus muffling Mr. Nixon's public impact.

Of special interest to Republicans will be his reasoning for not pressing harder with the election fraud charges. He discovered the shameful fact that it would take 18 months to get a recount in Cook County, Chicago, and that there was no way to force a recount in Texas. He decided to press no further, because otherwise "the orderly transfer of power might have been delayed for months." A more embittered individual could have created months of chaos in Washing-

Here is a self-portrait of a patriotic, closely reasoning in-dividual, anxious to establish a favorable image of himself, in crises pushing himself almost beyond endurance. One could still wish for more wide-horizoned sentiments of the caliber of Mr. Nixon's superb "accept-ance speech" at Chicago.